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PISTOL WHIPPED: BASELESS LAWSUITS,
FOOLISH LAWS*
Robert A. Levy**
INTRODUCTION
Although Congress and the majority of state legislatures have
resisted enacting draconian gun control laws, courts are the final
bulwark in safeguarding our constitutional right to keep and bear
arms. Yet the courtroom has become the scene of unprecedented
attacks as gun control advocates have used the judiciary to make
an end-run around the legislative process. Meritless litigation
brought by government plaintiffs in multiple jurisdictions are just
part of a scheme to force gun makers to adopt policies that legislatures have wisely rejected. Moreover, the politicians use these
suits to reward their allies—private attorneys who are often major

* For an earlier version of this article, see Robert A. Levy, Pistol
Whipped: Baseless Lawsuits, Foolish Laws, CATO POL’Y ANALYSIS, NO. 2,
May 9, 2001. This article raises several issues addressed by the author in previously published material that has been adapted for inclusion here. See Robert
A. Levy, Blackmail of Gun Makers, NAT’L. LAW J., Jan. 31, 2000, at A20;
Robert A. Levy, Clinton, Gore and a Million More, WASH. TIMES, May 12,
2000, at A20; Robert A. Levy, The Great Tobacco Robbery, LEGAL TIMES,
Feb. 1, 1999, at 27; Robert A. Levy, Turning Lead into Gold, LEGAL TIMES,
Aug. 23, 1999, at 21; Robert A. Levy, When Theft Masquerades as Law,
22(2) CATO POL’Y REP. 1 (2000); Michael I. Krauss & Robert A. Levy, So
Sue Them, Sue Them: Cities Look to Squeeze Gun Makers, WKLY. STANDARD,
May 24, 1999, at 19.
** Senior fellow in constitutional studies at the Cato Institute; Adjunct
Professor at the Georgetown University Law Center; Director for the Institute
for Justice, and Trustee of The Objectivist Center; Ph.D. in Business from
American University; J.D. from George Mason University.
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campaign contributors.
Meanwhile, many of the same politicians have exploited a
few recent tragedies to promote their anti-gun agenda. Those
politicians advocate gun control measures that have not been and
will not be effective. In fact, many of the recommended regulations will make matters worse by stripping law-abiding citizens of
their most effective means of self-defense. Violence in America
is not due to the availability of guns, but instead to social pathologies, such as illegitimacy, dysfunctional schools, and substance abuse.1 Historically, more gun laws have gone hand-inhand with an explosion of violent crime. Over the past decade—
because of vigorous law enforcement, a booming economy, and
an older population—there has been a dramatic reduction in violence, coupled with a record number of guns in circulation.
Despite those convincing statistics, during the summer of
1999 the Clinton administration threatened gun makers—already
engulfed by a torrent of litigation from dozens of cities—with additional claims from more than 3000 public housing authorities
coordinated by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”).2 While under President Bush, further action
by HUD will almost certainly be shelved,3 the ongoing city- and

1

NAACP head Kweisi Mfume acknowledges that there are “pathologies
in any society that contribute to violence,” for example, teenage pregnancy,
dysfunctional schools, drug and alcohol abuse, and a welfare system that subsidizes illegitimacy and unemployment. Draft of an Open Letter from John R.
Lott, Jr., Senior Research Scholar, Yale University Law School, to Members
of Congress (June 3, 1999) (on file with author).
2
See Paul M. Barrett, HUD May Join Assault on Gun Makers, WALL ST.
J., July 28, 1999, at A3 [hereinafter Barrett, HUD May Join Assault]. HUD
was “established in 1965 to coordinate and administer programs that provide
assistance for housing and community development.” COLUMBIA
ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2001), available at http://www.bartleby.com. The
department assists in funding solutions to the problems of housing and urban
development through state, local, or private action. Id.
3
See James Dao, The Nation: Over a Barrel; New Gun Control Politics:
A Whimper, Not a Bang, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001, at 4. “[T]he election of
President Bush, a long-time ally of the N.R.A., put a towering obstacle to gun
control legislation in the White House. As governor of Texas, he signed laws
making it legal to carry concealed weapons and difficult for cities to sue gun
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state-sponsored lawsuits could destroy the firearms industry, with
profound implications for the rule of law and the Constitution.
The government’s resort to litigation as a tactic of intimidation
and extortion will have destructive consequences extending far
beyond a single industry.
The current avalanche of lawsuits against gun makers began
unfolding in June of 1997.4 At that time, the giant tobacco commanufacturers.” Id.
4
The city, county and state lawsuits include, in chronological order by
filing date: New Orleans, LA (Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 9818578 Div. M (Parish of Orleans Civ. Dist. Ct. filed Oct. 30, 1998)); Chicago/Cook County, IL (Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 98-CHI15596
(Cook County Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 12, 1998)); Bridgeport, CT (Ganim v. Smith
& Wesson Corp., No. 06-CV-99-01531988 (Conn. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 27,
1999)); Miami-Dade County, FL (Penelas v. Arms Tech, Inc., No. 99-01941CA-06 (11th Cir. Ct. Miami-Dade County filed Jan. 27, 1999)); Atlanta, GA
(Atlanta v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 99-VS-0149217J (Fulton County Ct.
filed Feb. 5, 1999)); Cleveland, OH (White v. Hi-Points Firearms, No. CV99-381897 (Cuyahoga County C.P. filed Apr. 8, 1999)); Detroit, MI (Archer
v. Arms Tech., Inc., No. 99-912-658-NZ (Wayne County Cir. Ct. filed Apr.
26, 1999)); Wayne County, MI (McNamara v. Arms Tech., Inc., No. 99-912662-NZ (Wayne County Cir. Ct. filed Apr. 26, 1999)); Cincinnati, OH (Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S. A. Corp., No. A-99023169 (Ohio Ct. C.P. filed Apr.
28, 1999)); St. Louis, MO (St. Louis v. Cernicek, No. CV-992-01209 (St.
Louis Cir. Ct. filed Apr. 30, 1999)); Alameda County, Berkeley, East Palo
Alto, Oakland, Sacramento, San Francisco and San Mateo County, CA (People v. Arcadia Mach. & Tool, Inc., No. 303753 (S.F. Super Ct. filed May 25,
1999)); Compton, Englewood, Los Angeles and West Hollywood, CA (People
v. Arcadia Mach. & Tool, Inc., No. BC-210894 (L.A. Super Ct. filed May
25, 1999)); Camden County, NJ (Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders
v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 99-CV-2518 (D.N.J. filed June 1, 1999)); Boston, MA (Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 99-VS-0149217J (Suffolk
County Super. Ct. filed June 3, 1999)); Newark, NJ (James v. Arcadia Mach.
& Tool, Inc., No. ESX-L-6059-99 (Essex County Super. Ct. filed June 21,
1999)); Camden, NJ (Camden v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 451099 (Camden
County Super. Ct. filed June 21, 1999)); Los Angeles County, CA (People v.
Arcadia Mach. & Tool, Inc., No. BC-214794 (L.A. Super. Ct. filed Aug. 6,
1999)); Gary, IN (Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 45D029908-CT-355
(Lake Super. Ct. filed Aug. 27, 1999)); Wilmington, DE (Sills v. Smith &
Wesson Corp., No. 99-C-09283 (New Castle County Super. Ct. filed Sept.
29, 1999)); Washington, D.C. (D.C .v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 000000428 (D.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 20, 2000)); New York, NY (New York City v.
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panies first caved in to the state Medicaid recovery suits.5 Cigarette manufacturers, besieged by claims in dozens of states and
sued under perverted rules of tort law that eliminated any opportunity for an adequate defense,6 decided to settle. In other words,
the companies decided to bribe the politicians instead of going to
war against a punitive money grab. That capitulation—the surrender of the industry’s right to market a perfectly legal product—predictably spawned a new round of litigation. This time,
gun makers were pitted against the combined resources of billionaire trial lawyers, city mayors, county executives, a state attorney general, and the Clinton administration.
In bullying gun makers, the plaintiffs have included three corrosive ingredients carried over from the tobacco wars in their
litigation formula: First, they have sued in multiple jurisdictions,
thereby escalating the industry’s legal costs. Second, they have
employed contingency fee lawyers, many of whom were major
political donors. Third, they have tried to use the judicial branch
in order to bypass the legislature. Contrary to the plaintiffs’ arguments that those efforts will reduce gun violence, compelling
statistics suggest otherwise—that fewer guns in our society would
leave Americans more, not less vulnerable to gun violence.
In Part I of this article, I examine that new litigation paraArms Tech., Inc., No. 00 CV (E.D.N.Y. filed June 20, 2000); New York State
v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., No. 402586 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County filed June 26,
2000)).
5
“[G]iven the perverse legal rules under which the state Medicaid recovery suits were unfolding, the cigarette giants were effectively bludgeoned into
negotiating with the states and the trial lawyers.” See Robert A. Levy, Joel
Klein’s Legacy: The Mother of All Antitrust Violations, CATO: TODAY’S
COMMENTARY, Oct. 7, 2000. A Master Settlement Agreement, signed in November 1998 by the major tobacco companies and forty-six state attorneys general, includes a provision requiring non-signing cigarette manufacturers to post
pro-rata damages on sales in escrow for twenty-five years to offset any potential liability. Id.
6
See Robert A. Levy, Tobacco Medicaid Litigation: Snuffing out the Rule
of Law, CATO POL’Y ANALYSIS, NO. 275, June 20, 1997 [hereinafter, Levy,
Tobacco Medicaid Litigation] (noting that in the thirty-nine suits brought
against the tobacco industry, the states have circumvented the rules of
subrogation and have sued the manufacturers directly).
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digm. In Part II, I digress briefly to explore Second Amendment
concerns. In Part III, I analyze the suits threatened by public
housing authorities, the claims by some cities that gun makers are
responsible for “negligent marketing,” the allegation by other cities that guns are an “unreasonably dangerous” and “defective”
product, and the fallout from the Smith & Wesson settlement. Finally, in Part IV, I assess the data that allegedly links gun injuries and crime to gun ownership, and I conclude that the data in
fact shows an inverse correlation—i.e., high gun ownership leads
to fewer gun injuries and crimes—lending further support to the
notion that these lawsuits are entirely meritless.
I.

STATE-SPONSORED TORT SUITS: THE NEW PARADIGM

When public officials prosecute lawbreakers, those officials
are fulfilling a legitimate role of government. Most of the time,
that prosecutorial role is unobjectionable, often commendable.
But the latest rounds of litigation dealing with tobacco and then
guns are different in three respects, each of which threatens the
rule of law.
First, coordinated actions by multiple government entities can
impose enormous legal fees on defendants.7 As a result, those actions have been used to extort money notwithstanding that the
underlying case is without merit.8 For example, former Philadel7

See Robert A. Levy, Spoils of the Tobacco Shakedown: Contingent-Fee
Contracts Between State and Private Attorneys Should Be Illegal, TX. LAW,
Feb. 15, 1999, at 23 [hereinafter Levy, Spoils of the Tobacco Shakedown].
“The private attorneys who represented Florida, Texas, and Mississippi in
litigation against the tobacco industry have made out like bandits, fleecing tobacco companies, smokers, and taxpayers. In December, arbitration panels
awarded the lawyers $8.2 billion in legal fees.” Id.; see also All Things Considered: Tobacco Settlement Attorneys’ Fees (NPR radio broadcast, Sept. 25,
2001) (reporting that the “law firms who helped secure Michigan’s share of
the settlement are due $450 million”).
8
Legal commentators, newspaper columnists, and editors alike have used
the term “extortion” when discussing and describing suits initiated by cities,
states, and the federal government in an effort to target socially unpopular defendants. See, e.g., Robert A. Levy, The New Business of Government Sponsored Litigation, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 592, 593 (2000) [hereinafter
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phia Mayor Edward G. Rendell (D) called for dozens of cities to
file concurrent suits against gun makers.9 Gun manufacturers
“don’t have the deep pockets of the tobacco industry,” Rendell
explained, and multiple lawsuits “could bring them to the negotiating table a lot sooner.”10 Never mind that the suits are baseless. We are not dealing with law, but with extortion parading as
law.
One effective way to stop that thievery is to implement a
“government pays” rule granting a defendant’s legal fees when a
governmental unit is the losing plaintiff in a civil case. In the
criminal sphere, defendants are already entitled to courtappointed counsel if needed;11 they are also protected by the requirement for proof beyond reasonable doubt and by the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution.12 No corresponding
safeguards against abusive public sector litigation exist in civil
cases. By limiting the rule to cases involving government plaintiffs, access to the courts is preserved for less affluent, private
plaintiffs seeking redress of legitimate grievances. As a result,
defendants in government suits will be able to resist meritless
cases brought by the state solely to ratchet up the pressure for a
large financial settlement.
“Government pays” becomes ever more urgent with the recent emergence of an insidious relationship between the plaintiffs’ bar and some government officials. That relationship comLevy, The New Business]; James Bandler, Under the Gun, BOSTON GLOBE,
May 9, 1999 (Magazine), at 10; Christopher Gillott, Federal Tobacco Lawsuit
Ploy to Steal Companies’ Money, DAILY COLLEGIAN, Oct. 4, 1999; George
Will, Extortion Holds a Nation Hostage, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 26, 2000, at
21.
9
See, e.g., Fox Butterfield, New Orleans Seeks Millions in Gun Suit,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1998, at A16; New Legal Target: Cities Plan to Sue Gun
Makers over Cost of Crimes, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 1998, at A07; Peter
Nicholas, Philadelphia Mayor Has New Plan for Battle Against Gun Industry,
THE PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 31, 1998; Roberto Suro, Cities Plan Legal Assault on Makers of Handguns; Tobacco Lawsuits Viewed as Model, WASH.
POST, Dec. 23, 1998, at A01.
10
See Butterfield, supra note 9, at A16.
11
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
12
See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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mon to tobacco and gun litigation is a second major threat to the
rule of law.
The rounds of litigation against both the tobacco and gun industries were concocted by a handful of private attorneys who entered into contingency fee contracts with the government.13 In effect, members of the private bar were hired as government
subcontractors with a huge financial share in the outcome.
Rendell—not believing this to be a problem—announced that cities were suing gun makers for the purposes of improving safety
features and changing distribution practices, not for the purpose
of receiving monetary damages.14 Yet one day after Rendell’s
disclaimer, Miami and Bridgeport filed their suits, seeking hundreds of millions of dollars in damages.15 New Orleans asked for
damages,16 as did Chicago to the tune of $433 million.17 The
claims included not only medical costs associated with gun violence, but also the costs of police protection, emergency services,
police overtime and pensions, courts, prisons, loss of population,
cleaning the streets of blood, lower property values, even lost tax
revenue from reduced worker productivity18—plus punitive damages. And nearly all of the cities have solicited private lawyers to
13

See Levy, Spoils of the Tobacco Shakedown, supra note 7, at 23; Levy,
Tobacco Medicaid Litigation, supra note 7 (stating that attorneys involved in
the tobacco litigations in Florida, Texas, and Mississippi were awarded $8.2
billion in legal fees).
14
See Nicholas, supra note 9 (asserting that lawsuits filed against gun
manufacturers sought to recover costs from gun violence).
15
See Gail Appleson, Two More Cities Sue Gun Makers, WASH. POST,
Jan. 28, 1999, at A6.
16
See Butterfield, supra note 9, at A16.
17
Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley, Remarks at Press Conference (Nov.
12, 1998).
18
See, e.g., Appleson, supra note 15, at A6; Susan Kimmelman, Stick
‘Em Up: Suing Gunmakers for the Cost of Urban Violence, IN THESE TIMES,
July 26, 1998, at 13. In 1996 David Kairys, a law professor at Temple University, worked with civic leaders in Philadelphia to craft a lawsuit basing
damages on gun cost in terms of police, emergency personnel, public health,
courts and prisons. Id. “Kairys writes, ‘A city’s potential damages can begin
with a 911 call, cleaning blood from the street, and emergency medical care,
and continue through support of an orphaned child.’” Id.
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work for a contingency fee based on those damages.19
If money is not the primary goal of such litigation, a number
of attorneys will have worked for free. Maybe that is fitting. After all, the gun suits are not intended to go to trial. HUD’s
threat—on top of the city and county claims—was meant to promote a settlement, not a trial.20 No doubt, with a piddling $1.5
billion in annual revenues,21 gun makers are not going to yield
the same treasure trove as the tobacco behemoths whose worldwide sales are $300 billion.22 A comparatively small payoff is not
fatal, however. The real goal of the trial lawyers is to chalk up
one more victory, thus demonstrating to future fatter-cat defendants that groundless legal theories are good enough when the
coercive power of multiple government entities is arrayed against
an unpopular industry.
When a private lawyer subcontracts his services to the government, he bears the same responsibility as a government lawyer.23 He is a public servant beholden to all citizens, including
the defendant, and his overriding objective is to seek justice.
Imagine a state attorney paid a contingency fee for each indict-

19

See, e.g., Kimmelman, supra note 18, at 13 (stating that Kairys,
among others, was urged by civic leaders and Philadelphia’s mayor to develop
a lawsuit against gun manufactures on behalf of the city); Stuart Taylor, Jr.,
Guns and Tobacco: Government by Litigation, NAT’L J., Mar. 25, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 6436955 (stating gun lawsuits were bankrolled by contingent-fee lawyers).
20
See John Riley, Cuomo’s Stepping-stone/ HUD Position Was a Platform for His Political Career, NEWSDAY, Aug. 23, 2001, available at 2001
WL 9246991 (stating that HUD secretary Cuomo used the threat of a federal
class-action lawsuit against gun makers in order to influence them to settle
cases with states and cities).
21
See Paul M. Barrett, Jumping the Gun? Attacks on Firearms Echo Earlier Assaults on Tobacco Industry, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 1999, at A1.
22
Lung Association Calls on the Bush Administration to Strengthen
Global Tobacco Control Treaty, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Mar. 7, 2001 (“[W]orldwide sales of cigarettes reach[ed] $295.8 billion in 1996.”).
23
See John M. Burman, Special Ethical Duties of Government Lawyers,
23 OCT. WYO. LAW. 14, 14 (2000) (arguing that government lawyers, including those contracted to represent the government, are bound by the same ethical standards as lawyers in private practice).
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ment that he secures, or a state trooper paid per speeding ticket.
The potential for corruption is enormous. Still, the states doled
out multi-billion dollar contracts to private counsel in their tobacco suits.24 Those contracts did not call for per-hour fees,
which might occasionally be justified to acquire unique outside
competence or experience, but contingency fees, a sure-fire catalyst for abuse of power.25 Moreover, the contracts were awarded
without competitive bidding to lawyers who often bankrolled
state political campaigns.26 Put bluntly, contingency fee contracts
between government and a private attorney should be illegal. We
cannot in a free society condone private lawyers enforcing public
law with an incentive kicker to increase the penalties.
Government is the single entity authorized, in narrowly defined circumstances, to wield coercive power against private citizens. When that government functions as prosecutor or plaintiff
in a legal proceeding in which it also dispenses punishment, adequate safeguards against state misbehavior are essential. For that
reason, we rely primarily on private remedies with redress
sought by and for the benefit of the injured party and not the state
in civil litigation. As the Supreme Court cautioned more than
sixty years ago, an attorney for the state “is the representative
not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its ob-

24

See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (discussing these multibillion dollar contracts to private counsel).
25
Plaintiffs’ lawyers hired by the state have an inherent conflict. Because
they represent the state, their goal should be to seek justice. Because they may
potentially receive a huge payoff due to the contingency arrangement, plaintiffs’ attorneys cannot impartially evaluate a settlement agreement. Additionally, there is little justification for states to pay large contingency fees to those
attorneys when states have salaried attorneys on staff. See Levy, Tobacco
Medicaid Litigation, supra note 6; see also Carolyn Lochhead, The Growing
Power of Trial Lawyers, WKLY. STANDARD, Sept. 23, 1996, at 21 (arguing
that, because trial lawyers are “bankrolling politicians at a level unmatched by
any profession,” there exists a “blatant conflict of interest [inasmuch as] a
number of state prosecutors are handing out these multibillion-dollar contracts . . . to the same lawyers who donate money to their campaigns”).
26
See Lochhead, supra note 25, at 21.
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ligation to govern at all.”27
Third, and perhaps most important, laws are supposed to be
enacted by legislatures, not by the executive or judicial
branches.28 In too many instances, government-sponsored litigation has been a substitute for failed legislation. That process violates the principle of separation of powers—a centerpiece of the
federal constitution and no less important at the state level.29 Evidently, some attorneys general, mayors, and their allies in the
private bar are not concerned with that violation. In an attempt to
circumvent the legislative process, they intend to pursue through
litigation what was rejected by the legislature.
An interesting contrast can be drawn between legal perspectives on product prohibition prevailing in 1919 and those prevailing now. In 1919, because Congress did not have the power to
prohibit the sale of alcohol,30 prohibition was accomplished by a
constitutional amendment.31 Today, the drug war is entirely statutory32 with little thought of its constitutional implications. When
27

Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; art. II, § 3; see also Taylor v. Johnson,
961 P.2d 768 (N.M. 1998) (holding that the state Constitution grants exclusively to the legislative branch the power to enact new laws and amend existing laws).
29
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; art. II, § 3; see also Wayman v. Southard,
23 U.S. 1 (1825) (determining that the law is made by the legislative branch,
executed by the executive branch, and construed by the judicial branch).
30
48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors §§ 21-22 (1984) (noting that the right to
regulate or prohibit the sale or manufacture of alcoholic beverages rested exclusively in the states prior to the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment to
the Constitution).
31
U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend.
XXI. “[T]he manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors
within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United
States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes
is hereby prohibited.” Id.
32
See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 844 (making simple possession of controlled
substances unlawful and establishing penalties); 21 U.S.C. § 841 (making
manufacture, distribution and dispensing controlled substances or intent to do
so unlawful and establishing penalties); 21 U.S.C. § 878 (giving Drug Enforcement Administration personnel and certain state and local law enforcement officers power to conduct searches, seize controlled substances, and
28
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it came to tobacco, the Clinton administration argued not only do
we not need a constitutional amendment, we also do not need a
statute.33 Instead, according to the administration, we only need a
delegation of some sort to an unelected administrative agency,
the Food and Drug Administration, with authority to ban nicotine.34 And in the case of guns, some feel that we do not need a
constitutional amendment, a statute, or a delegation. Instead, we
only need multiple lawsuits as a means for the executive branch
to bypass the legislature and effectuate a variety of gun prohibitions.35 So much for limited government and separation of powers. We are left with the executive state—a modern-day return of
the king.
Under that regime, dozens of cities, aided by the Clinton administration, took the gun battle to the courts—suing gun makers
for “negligently marketing” a “defective product.”36 Before further discussing those lawsuits, however, a quick but important
detour—an examination of the debate surrounding the Second
Amendment—is warranted.
II. TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS
At the same time that cities were suing the gun industry, a
Texas appeals court was reviewing a lower court decision that

make arrests).
33
See Cable News Network, President Declares Nicotine Addictive (Aug.
23, 1996), at http://www.cnn.com/US/9608/23/clinton.tobacco.update. Clinton, instead of supporting a constitutional amendment or a federal statute, attempted to bring nicotine under the control of the Food and Drug Administration in approving federal regulations that declared nicotine an addictive drug.
Id.
34
Id.
35
See, e.g., David Kairys, The Governmental Handgun Cases and the
Elements and Underlying Policies of Public Nuisance Law, 32 CONN. L. REV.
1175 (2000) (considering public nuisance litigation claims by local government
executives against gun manufacturers as an effective means to curb proliferation of gun sales).
36
See supra note 4 (listing the suits brought against gun manufacturers by
various cities).
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invalidated a federal statute on Second Amendment grounds.37 It
examined the questions of whether the Second Amendment secures an individual right to keep and bear arms and, if it does,
what restrictions governments can place on its exercise. The
court’s answers to those questions could determine future legislation directed at stricter gun control.
The text of the Second Amendment reads as follows: “A well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”38 The question that seems to have perplexed the Supreme Court for more than two-hundred years is whether the
right to keep and bear arms, as laid out in the Second Amendment, belongs to each of us as individuals or to us collectively as
members of the militia. One approach to resolving that question
is to compare the text of the Second Amendment with the texts of
the First and Fourth Amendments.
The Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, refers explicitly to “the right of the people.” No reasonable person can doubt that First Amendment rights—speech, religion, assembly, and redress of grievances39—belong to us as
individuals. Similarly, Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures are individual rights.40 We secure “the right of the people” by guaranteeing the right of each
person. In the context of the Second Amendment, it does not pro-

37

United States v. Emerson, No. 99-10331, 2001 WL 1230757, at *7
(5th Cir. Oct. 16, 2001).
38
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
39
U.S. CONST. amend. I. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people to peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” Id.
40
U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
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tect the state, but each individual against the state—that is, the
amendment is a deterrent to government tyranny.41
Some would insist that although the threat of tyrannical government has not disappeared, it is less today than when our republic was experiencing its birth pangs.42 Perhaps so. Tyranny
may be a lesser threat now, but incompetence by the state in defending its citizens against criminals is a greater threat. The demand for police to defend us increases in proportion to our inability to defend ourselves. For that reason, disarmed societies
tend to become police states. Witness law abiding inner city residents, many of whom have been disarmed by gun control, begging for police protection against drug gangs despite the terrible
violations of civil liberties that such protection entails, such as
curfews, anti-loitering laws, civil asset forfeiture, even nonconsensual searches of public housing.
Even if a reduced threat of government tyranny were to no
longer require an armed citizenry, an unarmed citizenry could
well create the conditions that lead to tyranny. The right to bear
arms is thus prophylactic rather than remedial. It reduces the demand for a police state. George Washington University law professor Robert Cottrol puts it this way: “A people incapable of
protecting themselves will lose their rights as a free people, becoming either servile dependents of the state or of the criminal
predators who are their de facto masters.”43 Indeed, after the
atrocities of September 11, 2001, we learned that the state cannot
41

Government tyranny occurs when a government attempts to tell its people how to think, write, and pray. See John W. Bissel, Bench Opinion on the
Second Amendment, 10 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 807, 810 (2000).
42
See Bissel, supra note 41, at 810-11.
The protection of the States’ freedom and security from central government tyranny was a critical consideration for the drafters of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. . . . we have had our modern
counterparts . . . [however, the] critical underpinning of the Second
Amendment permits legislatures [t]o preserve the security of a State
and its citizens.
Bissel, supra note 41.
43
Robert J. Cottrol, Gun Control is Racist, Sexist, & Classist, AM.
ENTER., Sept. 1, 1999, at 60.
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defend its citizens against all acts of terror. It is imperative,
therefore, that we are able to defend ourselves.
More than sixty years ago the Supreme Court looked at the
question of an individual right or collective right in United States
v. Miller.44 Miller involved the 1934 National Firearms Act,
which required registration of machine guns, sawed off rifles,
sawed off shotguns, and silencers.45 In addressing the text of the
Second Amendment, the Court viewed “militia” as a term of art
meaning “the body of the people capable of bearing arms.”46
That suggests a right belonging to all of us as individuals. The
Court also held, however, that the right to bear arms extended
only to weapons rationally related to the militia and not the sawed
off shotgun at issue in Miller.47
That mixed ruling has puzzled legal scholars for six decades.48 If military use is the decisive test, one would think that
today’s citizens can possess rocket launchers, missiles, even nuclear arms. Obviously, that is not what the Court had in mind.
Because the Court’s opinion in Miller is so murky, argues
George Mason University law professor Nelson Lund, maybe the
only lesson we can draw is that the case must be interpreted narrowly, allowing restrictions on those types of weapons covered
44

United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). In that case, defendants
Jack Miller and Frank Layton were charged with unlawfully transporting a
double barrel 12-guage shotgun across state lines from Oklahoma to Arkansas
in violation of the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 1132 (1934). Id. at
175.
45
26 U.S.C. § 1132 (1934).
46
Miller, 307 U.S. at 179.
47
Id. at 178.
48
See, e.g., Christopher Chrisman, Constitutional Structure and the Second Amendment: A Defense of the Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 43
ARIZ. L. REV. 439, 441 (2001) (considering the meaning of U.S. v. Miller to
be “less than clear”); Nelson Lund, Outsider Voices on Guns and the Constitution, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 701, 703 (2000) (arguing that the Supreme
Court’s decision was “lazy and ambiguous”). Kevin T. Streit, Can Congress
Regulate Firearms?: Printz v. United States and the Intersection of the Commerce Clause, the Tenth Amendment, and the Second Amendment, 7 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 645, 662 (1999) (“United States v. Miller, which, like the
Second Amendment itself, was far from a model of clarity.”).
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by the 1934 Act—weapons like machine guns and silencers,
which have slight value to law abiding citizens, and high value to
criminals.49
Apparently, a few renowned, liberal law professors are now
taking that position. In a famous 1989 article, “The Embarrassing
Second Amendment,” Professor Sanford Levinson became the
first prominent liberal to acknowledge that the Second Amendment should be treated as something more than an inkblot.50 Evidently, the liberal apostasy has caught on. Harvard professor
Laurence Tribe and Yale professor Akhil Amar concede that
there is an individual right to keep and bear arms, albeit limited
as in Miller by “reasonable regulation in the interest of public
safety.”51
In effect, those scholars argue that the Second Amendment,
like the First Amendment, is not absolute.52 “Reasonable” restrictions—for example, on the types of weapons that can be purchased—may be justified on cost-benefit grounds. On the other
hand, Tribe and Amar imply that the Fourteenth Amendment
binds the states, not just the federal government, to honor the
Second Amendment.53 In that respect, the two professors go farther than our federal appellate courts, which have taken a states
rights approach to the Second Amendment, rubber-stamping state
gun prohibitions without subjecting them to rigorous constitu49

See Nelson Lund, The Ends of Second Amendment Jurisprudence: Firearms Disabilities and Domestic Violence Restraining Orders, 4 TEX. REV. L.
& POL. 157, 171 (1999) [hereinafter Lund, The Ends of Second Amendment
Jurisprudence].
50
See Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE
L.J. 637, 658 (1989) (arguing that the Second Amendment should “enter full
scale into the consciousness of the legal academy” and be taken seriously in
constitutional discussions).
51
Laurence H. Tribe & Akhil Reed Amar, Well-Regulated Militias, and
More, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1999, at A31.
52
Id. at 31 (“[I]t has been a terrible mistake for both sides in the gun control controversy to insist that the Second Amendment bans virtually everything
or virtually nothing.”).
53
Id. (stating that the Fourth Amendment, “which makes part of the Bill
of Rights applicable to the states, reflect[s] a broad agreement that bearing
arms was a ‘privilege’ of each citizen”).
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tional scrutiny.54
That difference between federal and state treatment is important in repudiating an argument frequently raised by anti-gun advocates—that the framers did not intend the Second Amendment
to bestow individual rights. For example, the Center to Prevent
Handgun Violence argues that when our nation was founded,
many states had communal storage of guns and restricted their
use to white males only.55 Pointing to the facts that Maryland actually seized guns that were not used in the militia and Pennsylvania denied firearms to 40% of its citizens for lack of virtue, the
Center concludes that the framers could not have intended an individual right to keep and bear arms.56 That argument, however,
has a missing link. Until 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment
was ratified, the Bill of Rights constrained only the federal government. What the states did prior to that time is not directly
relevant from a constitutional perspective.
With that background in mind, let us turn to an important
case in Lubbock, Texas, United States v. Emerson,57 recently decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. In affirming the lower court’s “individual rights” model of the Second
Amendment, the Fifth Circuit became the only federal appellate
court to reject unequivocally all varieties of the “collective
rights” model.58 Judge William L. Garwood’s comprehensive and
54

See, e.g., Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98, 103 (9th Cir. 1996) (dismissing plaintiff’s Second Amendment challenge to California’s concealed firearm
statute for lack of standing and declining to discuss the merits of the underlying case); Quilici v. Martin Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 269-70 (7th Cir. 1982)
(holding that any restriction the Second Amendment may place on the federal
government does not apply to the states).
55
For a specific analysis of the Center’s approach to the framer’s intent
of a “well-regulated militia,” see Center for Prevention of Handgun Violence,
The Myth of the Second Amendment, at http://www.bradycampaign.org/
facts/issuebriefs/second.asp (last visited Nov. 10, 2001).
56
See Rachana Bhowmik, Our Second Amendment Rights Are Not
Eroded: Our Understanding of Them, However, Is, CHURCH & SOC’Y,
May/June 2000, at 49.
57
No. 99-10331, 2001 WL 1230757, at *7 (5th Cir. Oct. 16, 2001).
58
Id. at 601-02. Here, the court rejects the notion that the framers had a
“collective rights” purpose in mind when drafting the Second Amendment.
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scholarly opinion said that the Constitution “protects the right of
individuals, including those not then actually a member of any
militia or engaged in active military service or training, to privately possess or bear their own firearms . . . that are suitable as
personal individual weapons.”59
In Texas, like many other states, spouses involved in divorce
proceedings can be placed under a court order restraining them
from harassing, stalking, or threatening their partner.60 A federal
statute makes it illegal for anyone under that type of restraining
order to possess a gun.61 Mr. Emerson was indicted under the
federal statute, and he contested his indictment on Second
Amendment grounds.62 In April 1999 a federal judge dismissed
the indictment, agreeing with Emerson that the statute violated
the Second Amendment.63
Specifically, in observing the “plain language” of the amendment, the court
finds that textually, “if the amendment truly meant what collective rights advocates propose, then the text would read, ‘a well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state and the right of the States to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed.’” Id. at 601 (alteration in original). Further, in
its historical analysis of the Second Amendment, the court states that the individual right to bear arms was “a right recognized in both England and the
colonies,” and was a “crucial factor in the colonists’ victory over the British
army in the Revolutionary War.” Id. at 603. After declaring independence and
establishing a new government through the Constitution, the “American founders sought to codify the individual right to bear arms, as did their forbears
one hundred years earlier in the English Bill of rights.” Id.
59
Id. at 37.
60
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.501 (2000).
61
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(B), (9) (2001). The statute provides that it is
unlawful for any person who is subject to a court order restraining “such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person
or child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that
would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child” to possess any firearm or ammunition. Id.
62
United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598, 599 (1999). Mr. Emerson claimed a personal right to bear arms under the Second Amendment, and
also challenged his indictment on other constitutional grounds, including the
Commerce Clause, the Fifth Amendment, and the Tenth Amendment. Id. at
599.
63
Id. at 614.
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The trial judge, Samuel Cummings, did not equivocate. He
said, “If the amendment truly meant what the collective rights
advocates propose, then the text would read, ‘A well regulated
Militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of
the states [or the militia] to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.’”64 Cummings might have added that a collective right,
if conferred on the states, would permit “state governments [to]
maintain military organizations independent from the federal
military, and to arm those organizations with nuclear weapons or
whatever else the state may choose.”65 A states’ rights approach
would also suggest that “Supreme Court decisions recognizing
that the federal government has final authority over the deployment and use of the National Guard must be incorrect.”66
When Cummings parsed the two clauses of the Second
Amendment, he concluded that “[t]he function of the subordinate
clause was not to qualify the right, but instead to show why it
must be protected. . . . If this right were not protected, the existence of the militia, and consequently the security of the state,
would be jeopardized.”67 In other words, the second clause (“the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed”) is operational; it secures the right. The first clause (“A
well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State”) is explanatory; it justifies the right. That syntax was not
unusual for the times. For example, the free press clause of the
1842 Rhode Island Constitution states: “The liberty of the press
being essential to the security of freedom in a state, any person
may publish his sentiments of any subject.”68 That provision
surely does not mean that the right to publish protects only the
press. It protects “any person,” and one reason that it protects
any person is that a free press is essential to a free society.
64

Id. at 601.
David B. Kopel & Richard E. Gardiner, The Sullivan Principles: Protecting the Second Amendment from Civil Abuse, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.
737, 739 (1995) (indicating that this is the logical conclusion of the “states’
rights only” argument).
66
Id. at 739.
67
Emerson, 46 F. Supp. at 601.
68
R.I. CONST. art. I, § 20 (1842).
65
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In a similar vein, Article I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution
gives Congress the power to grant copyrights in order to “Promote progress of Science and useful Arts.”69 Yet copyrights are
also granted to Hustler magazine, to racist publications, even to
literature that expressly seeks to retard science and the useful
arts.70 The proper understanding of the copyright provision is that
promoting science and the arts is but one justification for the
copyright power.71 Analogously, the militia clause helps explain
why we have a right to bear arms, but it is not necessary to the
exercise of that right.72
As one might guess, the Clinton administration took a different position as illustrated in the following exchange at the oral
argument before the Fifth Circuit in the Emerson case:
Judge William L. Garwood: You are saying that the Second Amendment is consistent with a position that you can
take guns away from the public? You restrict ownership
of rifles, pistols and shotguns from all people? Is that the
position of the United States?
Deputy U.S. Attorney General William Meteja: Yes.
Garwood: Is it the position of the United States that persons who are not in the National Guard are afforded no
protections under the Second Amendment?

69

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
See Lund, The Ends of Second Amendment Jurisprudence, supra note
49, at 176 (arguing that this clause also protects racists and others who seek to
retard the progress of science and useful arts).
71
See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best
way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors.”);
see also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 86 (2001).
72
See Lund The Ends of Second Amendment Jurisprudence, supra note
49, at 176 (arguing, inter alia, that prefatory phrases found in the Second
Amendment, “[a] well regulated Militia,” and Article One, § 8, cl. 9, “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” work neither to “limit [n]or
qualify the operative clause”).
70
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Meteja: Exactly. 73
Meteja later explained that even Guard members are only
protected by the Second Amendment when and to the extent that
their weapon is used for Guard business.74
That view cannot be reconciled with the text of the Second
Amendment, construed strictly in accordance with its original
meaning. The term “well-regulated,” in its eighteenth century
context, does not mean heavily regulated, but properly regulated.
Looked at in that manner, the Second Amendment ensures that
the militia would not be improperly regulated, even weakened,
by disarming the citizens who would be its soldiers.75
Bear in mind that Article I, section 8 gives Congress, not the
states, the power to call forth and “provide for organizing, arming . . . disciplining . . . and for governing” the militia.76 State
powers are limited to appointing officers and training. The framers feared and distrusted standing armies; so they provided for a
federal militia—all able-bodied males over the age of seventeen—
as a counterweight against potential tyranny.77 But the framers
also realized, in granting Congress near-plenary power over the
militia, that a select, armed militia subset like today’s National
Guard could be equivalent to a standing army.78 So they wisely
crafted the Second Amendment to forbid Congress from disarming other citizens, thereby certifying that the militia would be
73

Raymond N. Haynes, Second Amendment at Stake in Appellate Case,
L.A. METRO. NEWS-ENTER., June 27, 2000, at 9.
74
Id.
75
See Lund, The Ends of Second Amendment Jurisprudence, supra note
49, at 175 (asserting that the purpose of the Second Amendment is to prevent
Congress from using its “necessary and proper” Article I authority to disarm
the citizenry).
76
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
77
See Alan Hirsch, The Militia Clauses of the Constitution and the National Guard, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 919, 924 (“Indeed, ‘there was not a member of the federal convention who did not feel indignation’ at the idea of a
standing army.” (quoting 3 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 401 (1901)
(remarks of Randolph at Virginia convention))).
78
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 330-31,
380-81, 384-88 (Max Ferrand ed. 1966).
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“well-regulated.”
Consider also these three changes made by the 1789 Congress
when it drafted the amendment. First, Congress eliminated a provision excusing conscientious objectors from military service,
making it clear that the Second Amendment is about firearms, not
about military service.79 Second, it stripped the term “wellarmed” as a modifier of “militia,” again clarifying that the arms
belonged to the people, not the military.80 Third, it dropped the
phrase “for the common defense” after the words “to keep and
bear arms.”81 Here there is no ambiguity; the intent was to provide an individual right of defense, not common defense.
Finally, consider three other constitutional arguments against
gun control, apart from the Second Amendment. First, many gun
regulations are too vague and thus do not provide citizens with
adequate notice of the particular acts that are illegal.82 In that
79

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), reprinted in 15 THE
DOCUMENTED HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 346 (J.
Kaminski and G. Saladino, eds. 1984); STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY
MAN BE ARMED 81 (Liberty Press 1994); Symposium, Fresh Looks: The Second Amendment: The Highest State of Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
103, 120-121 (2000) [hereinafter Fresh Looks].
80
See 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 597-98, 623-24 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976); Fresh Looks, supra
note 79, at 120-21 (noting that Madison’s first draft of the amendment reading
“a well armed, and well regulated militia” was changed by the committee of
the House to read, “[a] well regulated militia, composed of the body of the
people,” and later to its present form).
81
See United States v. Emerson, No. 99-10331, 2001 WL 1230757, at
*25 (5th Cir. Oct. 16, 2001) (“[T]he Senate rejected a proposed amendment to
add the words ‘for the common defense’ just after ‘the right of the people to
keep and bear arms.’”); Fresh Looks, supra note 79, at 122.
82
See, e.g., Robert Batey, Vagueness and the Construction of Criminal
Statutes—Balancing Acts, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 65 (1997) (acknowledging that gun statutes have recently been attacked for vagueness and the circuit courts have differed in their interpretations of firearms legislation); Jon S.
Vernick & Stephen P. Teret, New Courtroom Strategies Regarding Firearms:
Tort Litigation Against Firearm Manufactures and Constitutional Challenges
to Gun Laws, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1713, 1733 (1999) (recognizing “that many
gun control laws have been challenged on the ground that they are impermissibly vague, in violation of due process”).
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way, the regulations offend the Due Process Clause.83 Second,
some federal controls may intrude on matters traditionally subject
to state supervision, or may exceed the powers of Congress enumerated in Article I, section 8. As such, those controls would
violate the Tenth Amendment.84 Finally, an individual right to
keep and bear arms could well be among the unenumerated rights
secured by the Ninth Amendment.85
III. LITIGATION TYRANNY
Switching gears from constitutional law to tort law, we next
turn to the deluge of lawsuits against the gun industry. First, we
83

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. “No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person . . . the equal protection
of the laws.” Id.
84
U.S. CONST. amend. X. “The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people.” Id. See also Vernick & Teret, supra
note 82, at 1720 (recognizing “that opponents to gun regulation statutes have
raised Tenth Amendment arguments”); Symposium, Triggering Liability:
Should Manufacturers, Distributors, and Dealers Be Held Accountable for the
Harm Caused by Guns?: The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act: Does It
Have a Shot at Success?, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 894, 916 (1995) (acknowledging “that a number of the circuit courts have held that some federal
gun regulatory acts are unconstitutional because they violate the Tenth
Amendment”).
85
U.S. CONST. amend. IX. “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.” Id.; see also Nicolas J. Johnson, Beyond the Second Amendment: An
Individual Right to Arms Viewed Through the Ninth Amendment, 24 RUTGERS
L.J. 1, 7-12 (1992). Johnson observes that the Supreme Court has acknowledged the existence of unenumerated rights, derived by manipulating enumerated guarantees. Id. at 7 (citing Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment and
Constitutional Legitimacy, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 37 (1988)). He discusses a
natural rights view of the Ninth Amendment as a method of manipulation and
suggests that an individual’s right to arms is a fundamental, natural right. Id.
at 20. For further discussion of Ninth Amendment interpretation, see Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Ninth Amendment and the “Jurisprudence of Original
Intention,” 74 GEO. L.J. 1719 (1986).
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examine the federal government claims, which the Bush administration will probably not pursue. Next, we consider litigation by
more than thirty cities and counties as well as New York State.
A. Federal Claims
At the federal level, Clinton’s HUD secretary, Andrew
Cuomo, had a plan to change the way the nation’s gun makers do
business.86 He advocated legal action by each of 3400 housing authorities in an attempt to hold gun makers responsible for defraying the cost of security guards and alarm systems installed to
curb violence in public housing.87 Like the cities, HUD said it
was not interested in money damages.88 While that may have
been the case, Cuomo and his acolytes understood very well that
the small gun industry could not afford to defend itself—even
against unfounded suits—in the face of such overwhelming firepower. Already smothered by litigation from dozens of cities and
counties, the gun industry would have been crushed under the
weight of such action. A Wall Street Journal story emphasized
that very point:
As with the municipal suits, one filed on behalf of housing authorities would be groundbreaking and certainly not
a sure bet to succeed in court. But a suit by a large group
of housing authorities could [exhaust] gun companies’ resources in pretrial maneuvering—by making demands for
documents concerning industry distribution practices in

86

See, e.g., Matt Bai, Guns: The Feds Fire a Round: Washington’s New
Tactic: Target Gunmakers with Litigation, NEWSWEEK INT’L, Dec. 20, 1999
(commenting that failures in gun war negotiations led to the Clinton White
House’s plan to initiate a suit on behalf of public housing authorities); Martin
Kasindorf & Wendy Koch, Industries Try to Build Defenses Against Lawsuits,
USA TODAY, Dec. 28, 1999, at 11A; Shailagh Murray, HUD’s Cuomo Is
Drawing Flak for His Stances, Critics Say Ambition Drives Homeless, Gun
Policies, Not the Agency’s Needs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 1999, at A20.
87
See Barrett, HUD May Join the Assault, supra note 2, at A3.
88
See Daniel Mitchell, Trampling the Rule of Law, WASH. TIMES, Dec.
17, 1999, at A16 (stating that HUD was primarily “seeking to stop irresponsible marketing practices on the part of gun makers”).
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hundreds or thousands of localities.89
Cuomo’s efforts, in essence, were no better than thinly veiled
blackmail.
In justifying HUD’s litigation plans, Cuomo contended that
“only one percent of the dealers are selling over 50 percent of the
guns used in crimes.”90 If, however, crimes were linked to guns
sold by particular dealers, there is no reason why the underlying
data was not turned over to authorities. It is, in fact, the authorities’ duty to shut down dealers who break laws on the books in
all fifty states.91 Instead, Cuomo sought to compel gun makers to
become police, judge, and jury. He expected such makers to ferret out “bad” dealers—some of whom were entirely innocent—
and to deny those dealers, without due process of law, the merchandise that they sell for a living.
In addition, Cuomo also demanded safer guns.92 “We have
safety caps on aspirin,” he has stated, so why not safety locks on
guns?93 That flawed logic, however, overlooks relevant differences between guns and aspirin. First, the requirement for safety
caps on aspirin arose out of legislation, not judicial mandate.94
Second, aspirin is legally accessible to kids, guns are not. Third,
guns and not aspirin are used to protect human lives; not many
89

Barrett, HUD May Join the Assault, supra note 2, at A3.
Anne Gearan, Threat of Suit Aimed at Putting Pressure on Gun Makers, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Dec. 9, 1999, at A13.
91
See generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 12290 (West 2001); MD. CODE
ANN. art. 27, § 442C (2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.418 (1999); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-17-1316 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.2:3 (Michie
2001).
92
See Gearan, supra note 90, at A13 (summarizing that “[t]he White
House and Department of Housing and Urban Development [Cuomo] want
gun makers to agree to a code of conduct that includes cracking down on disreputable gun dealers and making guns safer”); Eric Rosenberg, U.S. Readies
Suit Against Gun Manufacturers, Dec. 15, 1999, at A12 (noting that the aim
of HUD Secretary Andrew Cuomo and Bruce Reed, President Clinton’s point
man on gun policy, “would be to force manufacturers to produce safer guns
and new business practices to guard against shady dealers”).
93
Press Release, A Statement by Secretary Cuomo on School Shooting in
Michigan (Mar. 1, 2001) (on file with author).
94
See Poison Prevention Packaging Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1476 (1970).
90
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people when confronted with an emergency will turn to a bottle
of aspirin for protection. Use of a gun for self-defense could be
dangerously compromised if the gun is locked. Sammy “The
Bull” Gravano, the Mafia turncoat, aptly stated, “Safety locks?
You . . . pull the trigger with a lock on, and I’ll pull the trigger
[without one]. We’ll see who wins.”95
If Cuomo was so concerned about unsafe public housing, he
should have sued his own agency. HUD is responsible for housing authorities—including their location, selection of tenants,
eviction policies, even inadequate policing. But rather than admit
to the abject failure of public housing,96 Cuomo instructed his
minions to plan lawsuits, modeled after those filed by cities and
counties from coast to coast. Those baseless lawsuits embody two
principal legal theories: negligent marketing and defective products.
B. Negligent Marketing
The city of Chicago, and other cities following its example,
accused gun makers of “negligent marketing”—flooding the suburbs where gun laws are relaxed with more guns than suburban
residents will buy, knowing that the excess will find its way to
the inner city, where gun laws are more restrictive.97
Simple economic logic reveals the flaw in Chicago’s negligent marketing claim. If gun makers reduce the supply of firearms sold to suburban dealers, the market price of guns will rise.
Consumers with the most “elastic” demand—that is, consumers
who are most sensitive to price changes—will reduce or eliminate
their purchases. The evidence is clear that those price-sensitive

95

Howard Blum, Reluctant Don, VANITY FAIR, Sept. 1999, at 165.
HUD, under Cuomo’s command, failed to screen tenants, fix elevators,
and provide policing. See Richard A. Epstein, Lawsuits Aimed at Guns Probably Won’t Hit Crime, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1999, at A26. Considering guns to
be the major problem, HUD focused on suits against manufacturers, and, as a
result, overlooked vital steps leading to a severe decline in the state of housing
projects. Id.
97
See supra note 4 (listing suits filed by counties).
96
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consumers are typically law-abiding citizens.98 By contrast,
criminals’ demand for guns is highly “inelastic.” They operate in
a “survival at any price” environment, which is why crooks are
willing to pay inflated black-market prices for firearms. Perversely, by restricting the legal supply of guns and raising prices,
manufacturers will put relatively more weapons in criminals’
hands and relatively fewer in the hands of honest citizens.
Besides, any coordinated industry response to a negligent
marketing claim would run afoul of the antitrust laws. Manufacturers that supposedly overproduce would have to collude in order to reduce production jointly. Although Smith & Wesson is
aware of how many of its guns are going to, for instance, Maryland, those guns, by themselves, do not saturate the Maryland
market. Smith & Wesson has no idea how many Maryland guns
are shipped by Colt, Beretta, Glock, Ruger, or any other manufacturer. Because brands are more or less interchangeable, no
single gun maker would agree to cut back production for fear that
other manufacturers would simply take up the slack. Yet if the
companies were to collude, an antitrust lawsuit would surely ensue.
An obvious solution to Chicago’s problem, said the judge
who dismissed the city’s case this past September, would be for
the police to enforce laws that already prohibit sales to minors,
felons, the mentally incompetent, and anyone else without a stateissued firearm owners ID card.99 Instead, Chicago sued gun makers lawfully selling to wholesalers, who, in turn, sell to licensed
retailers. The city wanted to hold gun makers liable for the violent acts of criminals; however, most of these criminals—over
whom the manufacturer has no control—did not buy from licensed retailers.100 As the Seventh Circuit held in Bloomington v.
98

See Michael I. Krauss & Robert A. Levy, So Sue Them, Sue Them:
Cities Look to Squeeze Gun Makers, WKLY. STANDARD, May 24, 1999, at 19;
Levy, The New Business, supra note 8, at 599.
99
See Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 98-CHI15596, at 18 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook
County filed Nov. 12, 1998); see also Andrew Stern, Judge Dismisses Chicago Suit Against Gun Industry, REUTERS, Sept. 15, 2000.
100
See Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 98-CHI15596, at 51 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook
County filed Nov. 12, 1998).
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Westinghouse,101 a manufacturer cannot be held liable for creation
of a nuisance by the buyer unless the manufacturer participated in
the conduct.
The chain of causation is broken when a criminal act intervenes between a gun maker’s original sale and an injury arising
out of the gun’s violent use. That time-honored principle of law,
by itself, is sufficient to dismiss these cases.102 A gun maker is
liable only if the injury was foreseeable. An intervening criminal
act is foreseeable if it is the natural and probable outcome of the
gun maker’s sale. Although Americans own roughly 240 million
guns and commit about 450,000 gun-related crimes each year,103
only two-tenths of one percent of all guns is involved in criminal
activity in any given year, even if a different gun is used in each
of those crimes.104 That negligible chance of criminal conduct
surely does not cross the “natural and probable outcome” threshold.
The manufacture, sale, and ownership of handguns are highly
regulated. If a gun dealer knowingly condones so-called straw
purchases—those made by legal buyers on behalf of criminals—

101

Bloomington v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 891 F.2d 611, 614 (7th
Cir. 1989) (finding that a manufacturer and seller of chemicals did not commit
nuisance under Indiana law by selling chemicals that contaminated the city’s
landfill, sewer system, and sewage treatment plant because the chemicals were
no longer under the defendant’s control).
102
See, e.g., Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta
U.S.A. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 245, 259 (D.N.J. 2000) (finding that the
causal connection was weak, amounting to scarcely more than “an assertion
that because the gun manufacturers distribute their products, they eventually
fall into the wrong hands, are used to commit crimes against persons and
property, causing the County to expend money for law enforcement”); Bennet
v. Cincinnati Checker Cab Co., 353 F. Supp. 1206, 1210 (E.D. Ky. 1975)
(holding that the criminal act on the part of the shooter acted as a superseding
cause, thereby breaking the chain of causation); see also Shaun R. Bonney,
Using the Courts to Target Firearm Manufacturers, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 167,
191-92 (2000) (arguing that gun manufacturers are unlikely to be held liable
under traditional tort law in which causation is an essential element).
103
See John R. Lott, Jr., Suits Targeting Gun Makers Are Off the Mark,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 1999, at A18.
104
Id.
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the dealer can be prosecuted under current law.105 As of April
2000, seventeen months after Chicago filed its lawsuit, only four
of the retailers targeted by the city’s undercover “stings” had
been charged.106 In the only case to go to trial, the jury took but
ten minutes to find the defendant not guilty.107 If the behavior of
those dealers was as egregious as the city’s complaint suggests,
why were there only four indictments and zero convictions?
Nationwide, thousands of laws regulate everything from who
can own a gun and how it can be purchased to where one can
possess or use it.108 Nonetheless, in 1998 there were only eight
federal prosecutions for the thousands of instances that guns were
brought illegally onto school grounds.109 According to a Syracuse
University study, from 1992 to 1999, federal gun prosecutions
declined by 43%.110 Over the two years ended mid-1999, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (“BATF”) traced half of
the guns used in crimes to 389 dealers, but only nineteen had

105

See 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(2) (making it illegal for a dealer to ship or
transport to any person other than a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer,
licensed dealer, or licensed collector).
106
Devon Spurgeon & Paul M. Barrett, Operation Gunsmoke, Touted as
a Big Deal, Makes a Small Mark, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2000, at A1.
107
Id.
108
See John R. Lott, Jr., Gun Laws Can Be Dangerous, Too, WALL ST.
J., May 12, 1999, at A22; see also Kopel & Gardiner, supra note 65, at 76263.
Handguns are the only consumer product that an American consumer
is forbidden to purchase outside his state of residence. They are the
only mass consumer product for which retailers, wholesalers, and
manufacturers all require federal licenses. They are among a tiny
handful of consumer products for which the federal government regulates simple possession, and further regulates the terms of retail transactions, going so far as to require (for handguns) that police be notified and given an opportunity to disapprove the sale before being
allowed to consummate the transaction.
Kopel & Gardiner, supra note 65, at 762-63.
109
See Peter J. Boyer, Big Guns, NEW YORKER, May 17, 1999, at 62.
110
See Edward Walsh, Clinton Plans Gun Initiative, WASH. POST, Jan.
18, 2000, at A2.
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their licenses revoked.111 Moreover, a BATF study released in
June 2000 documented 1,700 federal and state gun-law prosecutions and 1,000 verdicts from July 1996 through December
1998.112 On a per-year basis, that equals 680 prosecutions and
400 guilty pleas—trivial numbers when contrasted with roughly
500,000 gun crimes committed in the United States each year.
The effect of more rigorous law enforcement and stiffer penalties is apparent from Richmond’s experience with Project Exile113—a federal program that, in part, mandates a five-year
minimum sentence in federal prison for any felon caught carrying
or trying to buy a gun.114 As a result of the program, Richmond
reported a 36% decline in gun homicides and 37% drop in armed
robberies for the 1997 calendar year.115 When the National Rifle
Association (“NRA”) sought to expand Project Exile, it received
little support from the Clinton administration until September
1999, at which time the president requested an inconsequential
budget increase of $5 million.116 Congressional Republicans had
wanted $27 million, albeit targeted at cities in states where the
111

BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, PUB. NO. NCJ 180795, FEDERAL FIREARMS OFFENDERS, 1992-98
(2000); see also Fox Butterfield, Limits on Power and Zeal Hamper Firearms
Agency, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1999, at A1. Julius Wachtel, retired after
twenty-three years as a BATF agent, remarked that he and his co-workers had
a saying: “No cases, no waves. Little cases, little waves. Big cases, big
waves.” Id.
112
Treasury Makes Case for Gun Show Clampdown, REUTERS, June 21,
2000.
113
Developed in 1997 by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Richmond, “Project Exile” facilitated the prosecution of illegal gun offenses in federal court,
created stiffer bond rules and sentencing guidelines, expedited the reporting
system, and decreased processing time for felons with gun charges associated
with domestic violence. In addition, the program improved police officer
training on federal firearms statutes and search and seizure issues. See Daniel
C. Richman, “Project Exile” and the Allocation of Federal Law Enforcement
Authority, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 369, 378-80 (2001).
114
Id. at 380.
115
See generally Michael Janofsky, Fighting Crime by Making Federal
Case About Guns, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1999, at A12.
116
See Saundra Torry, Federal-Local Gun Control Venture Stymied by
Success, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 1999, at A1.
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senators on the Appropriations Committee served, not at cities
where crime rates were highest.117
To be sure, the states, not the federal government, exercise
general police power. Why should federal courts be turned into
what one federal judge in Richmond characterized as “police
courts”?118 It would be far better for the states to stiffen their own
penalties than to federalize yet more crimes.119 Indeed, the federalization of most gun crimes cannot be squared with the Tenth
Amendment, which permits the federal government to exercise
only those powers that are enumerated in the Constitution and
delegated by it to the United States.120 Still, many federal criminal laws would qualify as a legitimate exercise of state police
power. In any event, non-enforcement—whether state or federal—cannot be laid at the doorstep of gun makers.
Naturally, if existing laws are not being enforced, the best
bet, according to the politicians, is to pass more laws. In the Chicago suburbs, for example, the Cook County legislature could
have enacted more restrictive gun laws. For whatever reasons, it
chose not to do so. Instead, Cook County signed on as coplaintiff in Chicago’s lawsuit to do what the county elected not
to. In effect, Cook County’s complaint to the court, quite literally, is that the county has itself failed to pass appropriate legislation.
C. Defective Product
Apart from negligent marketing, the second major claim
among cities suing the gun industry is that firearms are “defective and unreasonably dangerous” as they are currently manufactured.121 In order to hold gun makers liable for selling an unsafe
117

Id.
Id.
119
Richmond’s program, renamed Virginia Exile, is now under state control. See 160 Arrested as a Result of Virginia Exile, A.P., July 2, 2001.
120
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
121
See Ray Delgado, S.F. Joins Suit Against Gun Makers; Plaintiff Cities
Ask Restitution, Saying Firms Knowingly Get Weapons to Criminals, S.F.
EXAM’R., May 25, 1999, at A3 (“Cities have gone after the gun industry in a
118
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product, tort law requires a true defect, not merely that a product
is dangerous when it does what it is designed to do.122 The Washington Post has editorialized: “As a legal matter, it is hard to see
how companies making lawful products can be held liable when
those products perform precisely as intended.”123 With that in
mind, what then is the true defect of a firearm? Does it misfire,
or fire inaccurately? Not at all. Yet New Orleans and other cities
have insisted that guns are defective if sold without devices that
prevent discharge by unauthorized users. On that ground, the cities hope to drag gun makers to the settlement table—turning the
law of product liability on its head.
Legislatures across the nation have regulated virtually every
aspect of gun design and distribution. If a determination is to be
made that guns are unreasonably dangerous, the legislature, constrained by the Constitution, must make that determination, not
the courts. A federal judge in Massachusetts aptly captured this
sentiment in Wasylow v. Glock: “Frustration at the failure of legislatures to enact laws sufficient to curb handgun injuries is not
adequate reason to engage the judicial forum in efforts to implement a broad policy change.”124
Even Brooklyn’s Jack Weinstein, the favorite federal judge of
the plaintiff’s bar, had this comment about the safety of guns:
Whether or not . . . products liability law would require
variety of ways, filing products liability suits that charge manufacturers with
turning out poorly made guns or guns that lack safety measures.”); Mark
Long, Judge Dismisses Miami’s Lawsuit Against Gun Makers, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 15, 1999, at 4 (discussing Miami’s lawsuit, whereby
the city alleged that “[gun] manufacturers negligently design their guns”);
George Will, New Orleans Takes Aim at Gun Makers, AUSTIN AM.
STATESMAN, Jan. 24, 1999, at H3 (discussing New Orleans’ suit against fifteen gun manufacturers, whereby the city sought damages based on the sales
of guns that were unreasonably dangerous because “they did not incorporate
recognition technologies that would prevent their use by children or by anyone
other than the owner”).
122
See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2
(1998) (“[P]roducts are not generically defective merely because they are dangerous.”).
123
Editorial, Guns in Court, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 1999, at A18.
124
975 F. Supp. 370, 381 (D. Mass. 1996).
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an anti-theft safety mechanism as part of the design of
handguns requires a balancing of the risk and utility. . . .
Plaintiffs have not shown that such a device is available,
nor have they asserted the possibility of showing at trial
that such a device would satisfy the . . . risk-utility test.125
Weinstein added that “[t]he mere act of manufacturing and selling a handgun does not give rise to liability absent a defect in the
manufacture or design of the product itself.”126
If guns are inherently defective, then New Orleans and other
cities that have swap programs bring their suits under a cloud of
hypocrisy. In 1998 the New Orleans Police Department traded
more than 8,000 confiscated weapons—40% of which were semiautomatic—to a commercial dealer in return for Glocks.127 Nearly
half of the traded guns would have been characterized as “unsafe” in the city’s own lawsuit against gun makers—including
TEC9s,128 AK47s,129 and Uzis,130 banned since 1994. Only onefourth of the guns had safety locks. Still, Mayor Marc Morial
signed and approved the deal, paving the way for resale of those

125

See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307, 1323 (E.D.N.Y.

1996).
126

Id.
See Matt Labash, Lawyers, Guns, and Money, WEEKLY STANDARD,
Feb. 1, 1999, at 25-29.
128
A TEC9 is an inexpensive auto-loaded assault pistol manufactured by
Intratec Firearms. See Firearm Information by Type, at http://recguns.com/
IIIC2jl.html. Although not a fully automatic firearm, it looks like a miniature
submachine gun and features a threaded barrel and a thirty-round magazine.
Id.
129
An AK47 is a military assault rifle designed in 1947 by Russian General Mikhail Kalashnikov. See The AK47 Page, at http://members.tripod.com/
sa93/ak47.html. It is a cheaply manufactured lightweight automatic weapon.
Id. The AK-47 was the weapon of choice for the former Soviet Union and
Eastern European countries. Id.
130
The Uzi is a compact automatic weapon designed by Uziel Gal, an officer in the Israeli Army. Uzi Submachine Gun, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
available at http://www.britannica.com. Law enforcement personnel and
members of the Special Forces use it widely. Id. The weapon’s design is based
on earlier Czech designs, “in which bullets were fed into the gun’s chamber
from a box shaped magazine inserted into the pistol. . . .” Id.
127
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guns across the nation.131 Ironically, New Orleans could end up
as defendant in other cities’ suits.
Under pressure, Morial suspended the swap program.132 But
New Orleans was not the only hypocritical plaintiff. Police departments in Boston, Detroit, Oakland, Miami, St. Louis, and
Bridgeport have also traded-in “unsafe” guns, which are now
back on the street, even while suing gun makers for marketing a
defective product.133 Undoubtedly sensitive to the bad publicity,
several police departments announced they that would explore
lease programs, rather than trade-in programs, with Glock.134
While such a policy might relieve the city of direct responsibility
for providing unsafe guns for commercial resale, the revised contractual arrangement merely camouflages the same deal, the recycling of “defective” products for use by private citizens.
Whether the claim is a defective product or negligent marketing, these lawsuits are baseless. Only five of them have reached
final judgment and all five were fully or partially dismissed.135
For example in October 1999, an Ohio state judge threw out Cincinnati’s claims, holding that gun makers are not responsible for
the criminal misconduct of customers. “The city’s complaint is
an improper attempt to have this court substitute its judgment for
that of the legislature,” the judge explained.136 The suits in
131

See Labash, supra note 127, at 25-29.
See Jake Tapper, City Slickers, SALON NEWS, July 13, 1999 at 25-29.
133
Id.; see also Vanessa O’Connell & Paul M. Barrett, Unloading Old
Police Guns: More Cities Ban Trade-Ins and Resales, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10,
1999, at A1.
134
See Vanessa O’Connell & Paul M. Barrett, Cities Suing Gun Firms
Have a Weak Spot: They’re Suppliers, Too, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 1999, at
A1.
135
Other suits have been allowed to proceed in part, but none has prevailed on final judgment. See Supreme Court: State Can Block New Orleans
from Suing Gun Makers, A.P., Apr. 3, 2001. In 1999, Atlanta survived a motion to dismiss its design defect claim. Id. The following year, New Orleans
also survived full dismissal, as did Cleveland, Wayne County, and San Diego.
Id. In April 2001, however, the Louisiana Supreme Court threw out the New
Orleans claim, citing state law that bans litigation by cities against the gun industry. Id.
136
Court Rejects Cincinnati Suit Against Gun Industry, REUTERS, Oct. 7,
132
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Bridgeport and Miami were also dismissed in December 1999.
Miami’s judge observed that the city could not use the courts to
regulate because that is the job of the legislature.137 A Florida appeals court upheld the Miami ruling, calling the lawsuit “an attempt to regulate firearms . . . through the . . . judiciary.”138
“Clearly this round-about attempt is being made because of the
County’s frustration at its inability to regulate firearms,” the appeals court wrote. “The County’s frustration cannot be alleviated
through litigation.”139
On September 15, 2000, a judge threw out Chicago’s negligent marketing claim saying that statistical evidence of causation
was insufficient, and that individual instances of illegal sales
were a matter for the police to counter.140 Most recently, on December 21, 2000, a federal judge dismissed Philadelphia’s
claims, describing the city’s charge of public nuisance as “a theory in search of a case,” and rejecting the negligence claim “for
lack of proximate cause.”141
Nevertheless, the trial lawyers press forward. Sooner or later
they will likely find a sympathetic judge who is willing to ignore
the law in order to effectuate his personal policy preferences.
Such forum shopping is a favorite tactic of the plaintiffs’ bar. In
fact, the major reason each city has sued its local dealers as well
as gun manufacturers is so that a plaintiff and at least one defendant reside in the same jurisdiction. In that way, the case cannot
be removed to federal court, where the rule of law generally prevails—outweighing provincial prejudices.
While the search for friendly forums moves ahead, pending
lawsuits are having predictable effects. Smaller gun makers are
going out of business. For example, two California dealers have
declared bankruptcy. Colt announced a layoff of 300 workers and
1999.
137

See Paul M. Barrett, Florida Judge Dismisses County’s Suit Filed
Against Handgun Manufacturers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 1999, at B15.
138
Id.
139
Florida Appeals Court Rejects Gun Suit, REUTERS, Feb. 23, 2001.
140
See Andrew Stern, supra note 99.
141
Shannon P. Duffy, Philly Loses Its Gun Maker Suit, NAT’L L.J., Jan.
8, 2001, at A4.
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said it would withdraw from the consumer handgun business, focusing instead on military weapons and collectibles.142 Prospective litigation costs are showing up in higher gun prices. Top
quality handguns are now priced in the $350 to $550 range, and
fewer guns are available for less than $100. Those higher prices
have less impact on criminal demand than on the demand from
price-sensitive, law-abiding, especially inner-city citizens.
D. Smith & Wesson Settlement
On a parallel track, threatened litigation by the federal government and actual litigation by dozens of cities were used as a
bludgeon to force the industry’s largest manufacturer, Smith &
Wesson, into a settlement. Despite countervailing pressure from
its customers and other gun makers, Smith & Wesson threw in
the towel—explaining that $100 million or more in damages,
sought by several of the larger cities, exceeded the company’s
profits for the entire past decade.143 Moreover, the company protested, it cost $1 million to defend against each governmentsponsored claim.144 Smith & Wesson simply didn’t have the resources to fight multiple lawsuits across the country. Accordingly, on March 17, 2000, it surrendered.145
Essentially, the Smith & Wesson deal is no better than a
shakedown. Various government entities—HUD at the federal
level, New York and Connecticut at the state level, and thirteen
cities—agreed not to pursue their baseless but costly suits against
the company.146 Other cities and counties offered to review their
142

See Colt Said to Be Cutting Handgun Sales, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11,
1999, at A1.
143
See Gary Fields, For Smith & Wesson, Blanks Instead of a Magic Bullet, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 2000, at A24 [hereinafter Fields, For Smith &
Wesson].
144
Id.
145
Id. “[T]he $100 million sought in the suit brought by the city of Boston eclipsed [the] company’s combined profit for the past decade.” Id.
146
See Paul M. Barrett, Smith & Wesson Rivals Face Antitrust Probe,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2000, at B18 [hereinafter Barrett, Smith & Wesson Rivals]; Edward Walsh & David A. Vise, U.S., Gunmaker Strike a Deal: Smith
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suits, but made no formal commitment to exclude Smith & Wesson.147 In return, the gun maker pledged, first, to impose a number of restrictions on its dealers and distributors: (a) No sales of
any manufacturer’s guns unless the buyer has passed a safety
course and cleared a background check—even if the check takes
longer than the three-day period required by law; (b) no sales at
any gun shows unless all sales at the show are subject to a background check;148 (c) no sales of Smith & Wesson guns if “a disproportionate number of crimes” is traced to guns sold by a
dealer or distributor;149 and (d) no purchase by one person of
more than one gun at a time unless the buyer is willing to wait
fourteen days before picking up the remaining guns.150
Second, Smith & Wesson agreed to childproof all of its handguns within a year, presumably by using features like a heavier
trigger pull or a magazine disconnect, which prevent a gun from
firing once the magazine is removed. Under terms of the settlement, every Smith & Wesson handgun would also be equipped
with an external lock within sixty days and an internal lock
within twenty-four months.151
Third, the settlement required that each gun have a hidden se-

& Wesson Plans Safety, Sales Steps Suit Threats Dropped, WASH. POST, Mar.
18, 2000, at A1.
147
See Sharon Walsh, Gun Industry Views Pact as Threat to Its Unity,
WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2000, at A10; Steven Wilmsen, Smith & Wesson, City
Settle Lawsuit, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 12, 2000, at B4.
148
On April 13, 2000, Smith & Wesson issued a clarification—disputed
by lawyers for the settling cities—regarding the scope of background checks.
Smith & Wesson insisted that checks were required only for its weapons, not
those of other manufacturers, and that checks at gun shows applied only to licensed dealers, not private citizens. See Smith & Wesson, Government Reaffirm Settlement, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 2000, at A7.
149
Susan Milligan, Gun Maker to Add Safety Measures, Clinton Hails
Smith & Wesson Act, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 18, 2000, at A1.
150
See Walsh & Vise, supra note 146, at A1.
151
See DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT,
AGREEMENT BETWEEN SMITH & WESSON AND THE DEPARTMENTS OF
TREASURY AND HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
AND STATES (2000), available at http://www.hud.gov.
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rial number to facilitate tracing a weapon used in a crime.152
Fourth (reminiscent of the tobacco settlement that forced manufacturers to fund anti-smoking programs), Smith & Wesson
promised to “work together to support legislative efforts to reduce firearm misuse” and contribute 1% of its revenue toward an
“education trust fund” to inform the public about the risk of firearms.153 An Oversight Committee in each settling city—
comprised of one Smith & Wesson official and one representative
each from the city, county, state, and federal government—was
set to monitor and supervise all provisions of the settlement.154
Those terms and conditions obscure what is actually driving
the settlement. From the government’s perspective, the settlement
was a means to bypass state and federal legislatures that had been
singularly unresponsive to a variety of gun control proposals.
Moreover, the settlement circumvents court review in many jurisdictions. Judicial approval would be required only in jurisdictions
where lawsuits had already been filed and were to be dismissed
as a condition of the settlement. That excludes the suits threatened but not filed by HUD and various cities and states.
To sweeten the deal further, President Clinton sought to assemble the Communities for Safer Guns Coalition, an alliance of
local governments, along with HUD, that would refrain from
buying police firearms manufactured by any company that did not
sign the settlement.155 That commitment to favor Smith & Wesson was not embedded in the text of the settlement agreement,
but communicated informally by Clinton.156 Perhaps Clinton

152

Id.
Id.
154
Id.
155
The Communities for Safer Guns Coalition was announced formally on
March 22, 2000 by HUD Secretary Andrew Cuomo. See generally Ed Somers, Communities for Safer Guns Coalition Doubles to 411, CRIME AND
DRUGS, May 22, 2000, available at http://www.usmayors.org/uscm/wash_
update/crime/coalition052200.htm; Ed Somers, Mayors, Counties, State AG’s
Form “Communities for Safer Guns Coalition,” CRIME AND DRUGS, Mar. 31,
2000, available at http://www.usmaors.org/uscm/wash_update/crime/0033100
a.htm.
156
See Edward Walsh & Helen Dewar, Government Coalition to Try to
153

LEVYMACRO2-20.DOC

38

2/22/02 4:26 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

knew that such an arrangement might violate local and federal
procurement regulations, discriminate against law abiding gun
makers, and deny disfavored companies the right to pursue a legitimate business.
In June 2000, the House of Representatives attempted, unsuccessfully, to pass a bill prohibiting enforcement of the Smith &
Wesson settlement.157 It did, however, approve a provision that
would prevent spending in support of Clinton’s coalition, which
ultimately comprised 600 localities that agreed, first, not to sue
Smith & Wesson and, second, to favor the company in police gun
buys.158 Shortly thereafter, the Senate approved of a bill barring
federal procurement preferences for Smith & Wesson.159 With a
change in administration, the settlement probably will not attract
other gun makers as co-signers, nor is the settlement likely to
benefit Smith & Wesson, which announced this past June that it
was closing two of its plants for a month, partly due to adverse
customer reaction.160
As the real terms of the settlement (including preferential
contracting) became clear, seven gun makers and their trade association, the National Shooting Sports Foundation (“NSSF”),
filed suit against HUD Secretary Cuomo, New York attorney
general Eliot Spitzer, Connecticut attorney general Richard Blumenthal, and fourteen mayors for conspiring to violate the consti-

Pressure Gunmakers, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2000, at A8.
Seeking to keep pressure on the gun industry, Housing and Urban
Development Secretary Andrew M. Cuomo and representatives of the
[Communities for Safer Guns Coalition] said the combined purchasing power of federal, state and local law enforcement should be
brought to bear on gun manufacturers to pressure them into adopting
the Smith & Wesson agreement or risk the economic consequences.
Id.
157
H. AMDT. 863, 106th Cong. (2000), available at http://thomas.loc.
gov.
158
See Fields, For Smith & Wesson, supra note 143, at A24; Alan Fram,
House Votes Affect Gun Agreement, A.P., June 21, 2000.
159
See Fields, For Smith & Wesson, supra note 143, at A24.
160
Gun Maker to Suspend Factory Lines, A.P., June 13, 2000.
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tutional right of the gun makers to engage in trade.161 The plaintiffs asked a federal court to forbid new gun regulations that were
not authorized by Congress.162 By August 2000, however, it was
apparent that the buying preferences had not materialized. Police
departments, for obvious reasons, wanted the best weapons available. Even HUD bought guns from Glock,163 which did not sign
the settlement yet continued to supply roughly two-thirds of police weapons nationally.164 In January 2001, NSSF and the seven
gun makers dropped their suit.165
On another front, to intensify the pressure for a settlement,
Cuomo, Spitzer, and Blumenthal threatened an antitrust suit
against Smith & Wesson’s rivals for organizing a boycott against
that company’s products. Blumenthal issued subpoenas for documents, despite no “solid evidence” other than a post-settlement
industry meeting attended by a number of gun makers, who expressed criticism of Smith & Wesson and the settlement.166
Spitzer pulled no punches. The goal, he gloated, was to “squeeze
[gun] manufacturers like a pincers,”167 proving once again that
unprincipled politicians are more than willing to use the antitrust
laws as a club to force conformity by companies that refuse to
play ball.
IV. GUNS, CRIME AND ACCIDENTS
“Rome remained free for four hundred years and Sparta
for eight hundred” with an armed populace, while other
countries who disarmed their citizens “lost their liberties
161

National Shooting Sports Found. v. Cuomo, No. 00-CV-1063 (N.D.
Ga. filed Jan. 5, 2001).
162
See Lisa Richwine, Gunmakers File Suit Against U.S., States, Mayors,
REUTERS, Apr. 26, 2000.
163
See Fields, For Smith & Wesson, supra note 143, at A24.
164
See Walsh & Dewar, supra note 156, at A8.
165
See Gunmakers Drop Suit Against HUD, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2001,
at A12.
166
See Barrett, Smith & Wesson Rivals, supra note 146, at B18.
167
See Peter Slevin & Sharon Walsh, Connecticut Subpoenas Firms in
Gun Antitrust Probe, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2000, at A2.
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in less than forty years.”168

Paradoxically, politicians who are busily abusing the rule of
law, and zealots so eager to put gun makers out of business,
overlook compelling statistics suggesting that the anti-gun crusade, if successful, would leave Americans more, not less,
susceptible to gun violence. Three thousand criminals are
lawfully killed each year by armed civilians.169 By comparison,
police kill fewer than 1,000 criminals annually.170 Guns are used
defensively over two million times per year, and are often merely
brandished, not fired.171 That number is far greater than the
483,000 gun-related crimes reported to police in 1996.172
Nationwide, as Yale scholar John Lott has demonstrated, the
higher the number of carry permits in a state, the larger the drop
in violent crime.173 Our country’s most permissive gun carry laws
are in Vermont, which has a very low crime rate.174 Half of our
population lives in thirty-one states that have “shall issue”
laws.175 Such laws mandate that a permit be granted to anyone
168

STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED 22 (Liberty
Press 1994) (quoting NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE ART OF WAR 18 (Ellis
Farneworth ed. 2001)).
169
See H. Sterling Burnett, Making Guns Safe for Lawyers, WASH.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 1999, at A19.
170
See id.
171
John R. Lott Jr., Will Suing Gunmakers Endanger Lives? CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 17, 1998, at 19 [hereinafter Lott, Suing Gunmakers].
172
See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Sourcebook of
Criminal Justice Statistics 1997, at 274 Table 3.116, in H. Sterling Burnett,
Suing Gun Manufacturers: Hazardous to Our Health, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL.
433, 446 (2001).
173
Lott, Suing Gunmakers, supra note 171, at 19.
174
See Concealed Weapons, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., June 6, 1997, at 16B,
available at 1997 WL 4545759. “The state of Vermont has long allowed concealed carry with no permit whatsoever—and Vermont has the lowest violent
crime rate in the United States.” Id. Vermont’s violent crime rate was 120
violent crimes per 100,000 people in 1997. In comparison, the national violent
crime rate was 611 violent crimes per 100,000 people. See U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1999, 250 (2000).
175
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-3302 (Michie 2000); IND. CODE § 35-47-
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above the age of twenty-one who is mentally competent, has no
criminal record, pays the requisite fee, and passes a gun safety
course.176 Those states have not turned into Dodge City, writes
columnist Jonathan Rauch, “with fender-benders becoming hailstorms of lead.”177
Data shows that Dodge City was actually safer than today’s
Washington, D.C., which has the highest gun murder rate in the
United States, accompanied by the strictest gun control.178 Is that
because guns are readily available in nearby Virginia? Why then
is the D.C. murder rate fifty-seven per 100,000 while the murder
rate in Arlington, Virginia, an urban community just across the
river, is only 1.6 per 100,000?179 In D.C., social pathologies—
like illegitimacy, unemployment, dysfunctional schools, and substance abuse—promote crime while in Virginia guns deter crime.
In reality, less than 5% of the population takes out concealed
handgun permits.180 The rest of us benefit because the criminals
do not know which 5% are armed. Laws permitting the carrying
of concealed handguns reduce murder by about 8% and rape by
about 5%.181 Police carry guns; mayors and bodyguards carry
guns; why not law-abiding residents of high crime areas?
In May 1998, the House of Representatives passed—by voice
vote with almost no debate—a bill permitting federal judges (including bankruptcy judges and even some retired judges) to carry

2 (2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-47-8 (2000).
176
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-3302 (Michie 2000) (stating that “[t]he
sheriff of a county shall, within ninety (90) days after filing of an application
by any person who is not disqualified from possessing or receiving a firearm
under state or federal law, issue a license to carry a weapon concealed on his
person within this state for four (4) years from the date of issue”).
177
Jonathan Rauch, And Don’t Forget Your Gun, NAT’L J., Mar. 20,
1999, available at 1999 WL 8102265.
178
Id.
179
Firearms Fact-Sheet, Gun Owners Foundation, at http://www.gunowners.org.
180
See Rauch, supra note 177.
181
JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING
CRIME AND GUN CONTROL LAWS 51 (1998).
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concealed guns in any state, despite state laws to the contrary.182
A Florida federal district judge, Harvey Schlesinger, had this to
say: “If a judge is in danger, the fact that he or she is in one state
or the other does not eliminate the danger.”183 He might have
made the same statement about any person at risk.
That high gun ownership is the cause of the high murder rate
in the United States is a myth. Comparable statistics from other
countries demonstrate that there is no correlation between high
gun ownership and high murder rates. In Switzerland, Finland,
and New Zealand, roughly the same percentage of the population
owns guns as in the U.S., but we have a far higher murder
rate.184 In Israel, moreover, gun ownership is 40% above the
U.S. rate, but the murder rate is far lower.185 Further foreign statistics demonstrate that disarming a population leads to increased
crime rates. In Australia, for example, the population was disarmed in 1998.186 Since then, homicides are up 3.2%, assaults up
8.6%, and armed robberies up 44%.187 For twenty-five years
prior, armed robberies and homicides committed with firearms
had declined.188
As that and other evidence suggests, armed civilians in fact
deter crime. Examples abound of instances when armed citizens
182

Federal Courts Protection Act of 1998, H.R. 2294, 105th Cong. § 304

(1998).
183

Elizabeth A. Palmer, House Votes to Expand Federal Judges’ Gun
Rights, Use of Cameras in Court, CQ WEEKLY, May 27, 2000, at 1277.
184
John R. Lott, Jr., Gun Control Advocates Purvey Deadly Myths,
WALL ST. J, Nov. 11, 1998, at A22 [hereinafter Lott, Gun Control Advocates]. Interestingly, in Israel, armed teachers are common. See Massad
Ayoob, Arm Teachers to Stop School Shootings, WALL ST. J., May 21, 1999,
at A12. The terrorist threat is pervasive; but there are few terrorist attacks at
schools. Id.
185
Lott, Gun Control Advocates, supra note 184, at A22.
186
See Ayoob, supra note 184, at A12.
187
Ann Coulter, Massacres Don’t Occur When Intended Victims Are
Armed, UNIVERSAL PRESS SYNDICATE, July 30, 1999, available at http://
www.uexpress.com/anncoulter.
188
Gun Control: Less Protection, More Crime, FLA. TIMES UNION, Apr.
7, 1999, at B6; see also DAVID B. KOPEL, THE SAMURAI, THE MOUNTIE, AND
THE COWBOY 193-232 (1992).
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have prevented horrific crimes through the use of firearms. An
armed gun-store employee in Santa Clara, California shot a customer who had threatened to kill three others.189 Armed citizens
prevented massacres in Anniston, Alabama, Pearl, Mississippi,
and Edinboro, Pennsylvania.190 Yet the response of some politicians is to disarm those very same citizens.
Gun control advocates reject the well-supported argument that
guns deter crime. Instead, they point to a study by Arthur Kellerman, who concluded that families possessing a gun are twentytwo times more likely to kill other family members or acquaintances than to kill in self-defense.191 But what is not factored into
the Kellerman equation is the fact that a gun is rarely fired in a
self-defense scenario; the value of the gun in such an instance is
to deter, not kill.192 Moreover, 85% of the deaths that Kellerman
cites are suicides.193 He explains that suicides are five times more
likely if there is a gun in the home.194 Kellerman, however, has
the causal relationship exactly backwards. Gun possession does
not lead someone to commit suicide; instead, emotionally disturbed people acquire guns precisely because they intend, or may
be psychologically prone, to commit suicide.195
Again conflating cause and effect, Kellerman notes that a
handgun in the home raises the risk of death by 3.4 times.196 Yet
he misses the obvious link. People at risk buy guns; the risk motivates the purchase, not vice versa.197 By analogy, a storeowner
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See Vin Suprynowicz, No Serial Killings This Week in Santa Clara,
LAS VEGAS REV.-J., July 11, 1999, at 2E.
190
See Coulter, supra note 187.
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See Paul M. Barrett, In Gun Debate, Both Sides Simplify Data to Make
a Case, WALL ST. J., May 27, 1999, at B1 [hereinafter Barrett, In Gun Debate].
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See id.
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DAN POLSBY, FIREARMS AND CRIME, INDEP. INST. (1997), available
at http://www.independent.org/tii/catalog_pr/policy_FirarmsAndCrime.html.
194
See Barrett, In Gun Debate, supra note 191, at B1.
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See Barrett, In Gun Debate, supra note 191, at B1.
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See David B. Kopel, Guns, Germs, and Science: Public Health Approaches to Gun Control, 84 J. MED. ASS’N GA. 269, 271 (June 1995).
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might decide to put iron bars on his store windows if the store
was located in a high crime area. Surely, no one would suggest
that the store would be safer if it removed the bars. Nor would a
family in a high risk inner city environment be safer if it relinquished its handgun. The gun, like the bars, serves to safeguard
lives and property.
The important point to remember is that each individual could
well be the sole means of his own defense. Kopel and Gardiner
make the point as follows:
Governments are immune from suit for failure—even
grossly negligent or deliberate failure—to protect citizens
from crime. Similarly, governments are immune from suit
for injuries inflicted by criminals who were given early
release on parole. Accordingly, it would be highly inappropriate for the government, through the courts, to make
it . . . impossible for persons to own handguns for selfdefense because, supposedly, ordinary Americans are too
stupid and clumsy to use them effectively. If the Judiciary
will not question the government’s civil immunity for
failure to protect people, the courts certainly should not
let themselves become a vehicle that deprives people of
the tools they need to protect themselves.198
Ask yourself whether you would be willing to put a sign on your
house stating, “This home is a gun-free zone”199—especially if
you lived in the inner city.
Several African-American leaders recognize, moreover, the
need for inner city communities to arm themselves. Professor
Cottrol reminds us that late-nineteenth to early-twentieth century
state gun control laws were aimed specifically at keeping guns
away from ex-slaves, other blacks, and recent immigrants.200

lence or Pandemic of Propaganda?, 62 TENN. L. REV. 513, 584-96; see
generally David B. Kopel, Lawyers, Guns, and Burglars, 43 ARIZ. L. REV.
345 (2001).
198
Kopel and Gardiner, supra note 65, at 747-48.
199
John R. Lott, Jr., draft of an open letter to members of Congress, June
3, 1999.
200
Id.
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Cottrol, a self-described Hubert Humphrey Democrat, also writes
that “[b]ans on firearms ownership in public housing, the constant effort to ban pistols poor people can afford—scornfully labeled ‘Saturday Night Specials’ and more recently ‘junk guns’—
are denying the means of self-defense to entire communities in a
failed attempt to disarm criminal predators.”201
Similarly, Gregory Kane, an African-American columnist for
the Baltimore Sun further acknowledges that “[t]he NAACP
should be assuring that every law-abiding citizen in America’s
black communities has a safe, affordable handgun. . . . These
young men are smart enough to know that the combined forces of
city and state governments, Bill Clinton, the police, the NAACP,
and the outrage of gun controllers won’t protect them.”202 Civil
rights activist Charles Evers was even more blunt: “I put my
trust in God and my .45 . . . and not always in that order.”203
One would have thought that, before filing their lawsuits,
federal, state and local governments would have examined the
historical record. In 1967, a thirteen-year-old could buy a rifle
from most hardware stores or even through the mail. Very few
states had retail age restrictions for handguns. Until 1969, most
New York City high schools had shooting clubs; students regularly competed in shooting contests, and the federal government
paid for rifles and ammunition.204 Federal and state gun laws today are far more restrictive than they were three decades ago.205
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Robert L. Cottrol, A Liberal Democrat’s Lament: Gun Control Is Racist, Sexist & Classist, AM. ENTER., Sept.-Oct. 1999, at 58-60.
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Gregory P. Kane, NAACP Gets Good, Bad Marks, RICH. TIMESDISPATCH, Aug. 15, 1999, at F3.
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See John R. Lott, Jr., More Gun Controls? They Haven’t Worked in
the Past, WALL ST. J., June 17, 1999, at A26 [hereinafter Lott, More Gun
Controls?].
205
See Alana Bassin, Why Packing a Pistol Perpetuates Patriarchy, 8
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 351, 361 (1997) (chronicling federal gun control
since 1934); Philip J. Cook & James A. Leitzel, Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy: An Economic Analysis on Gun Control, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
91, 93-94 (1996) (describing how the Brady Law substantially increased federal regulation of guns since the Gun Control Act of 1968).
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Yet, until the 1990s, the creation of laws went hand in hand with
an explosion of violent crime.
While gun ownership rates were constant through the 1960s
and 1970s, the rate of violent crime skyrocketed. With ownership
rates growing during the 1990s, we have seen dramatic reductions in crime.206 Recent statistics from the U.S. Bureau of Justice show that gun deaths and injuries declined by 33% from
1993 through 1997, with the decline continuing in 1998.207 During the same period of time, the number of circulating guns in the
U.S. grew by 10%.208 In short, despite misleading reports from
the media, there is no evidence to suggest that gun ownership and
violent crime are directly linked.
For the five years ended 1997, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) reported a 21% decrease in violent
crime, 21% decrease in gun-related deaths, and 41% decrease in
non-fatal gun injuries.209 Gun deaths and overall homicides
reached their lowest level in more than thirty years.210 Some experts cite tougher gun control and safety courses, but that does
not explain why all violent crime decreased by the same percentage as gun-related crime.211 The likely reasons for the parallel
decline are more vigorous enforcement, a booming economy, a
waning crack trade, and an aging population.
The CDC also reports that violent behavior by adolescents is
on the wane, despite Columbine and other high-profile school in-
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See Lott, More Gun Controls?, supra note 204, at A26.
See Gary Fields, Gun Conundrum: More on Streets, Fewer Incidents,
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cidents.212 That decline has been confirmed by data from the U.S.
Department of Education indicating that expulsions for bringing
firearms to school during the academic year 1997-98 were onethird less than the prior year.213 Out of more than 32,000 gunrelated deaths, only 630 were kids under fifteen. Of those, 142
were accidental.214 Predictably, that good news was met by an
outcry from the Washington Post: Safety locks will “reduce this
country’s horrifying accidental-gun-death rate of children under
15.”215
While some may find those statistics horrifying, more kids
under fifteen are killed by bikes, swimming pools and cigarette
lighters than by gun accidents.216 Will our city mayors be pursuing each of those industries? If gun manufacturers are responsible
for violence, why not the makers of the steel used in the guns?
Indeed, when an Ohio appellate judge upheld the dismissal of
Cincinnati’s gun suit in August 2000, he wrote the following:
“Were we to decide otherwise, we would open a Pandora’s box.
The city could sue the manufacturers of matches for arson, or
automobile manufacturers for traffic accidents, or breweries for
drunken driving.”217
If anything, the case for holding car makers liable for drunk
driving accidents is stronger than the case for charging gun makers for gun-related injuries. “In contrast to gun dealers, automobile [manufacturers] make no effort at all to ensure that the buyer
is not a criminal. Nor do automobile manufacturers require that
their dealers take even minimal steps to check if a prospective
212

See June Kronholz, School Firearm Expulsions Dropped in ‘97-‘98,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 1999, at A4.
213
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215
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2000,at A18.
216
See George Will, Handguns and Hired Guns, WASH. POST, Jan. 24,
1999, at B7.
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Aug. 12, 2000, available at http://enquirer.com/editions/2000/08/ 12/loc_city
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automobile purchaser has recent convictions for drunk or reckless
driving, or even for vehicular homicide.”218 Moreover, “automobile manufacturers have much more ability than gun manufacturers to control dealer behavior, since most automobile manufacturers have exclusive, direct relationships with dealers. In
contrast, the majority of gun dealers purchase inventory from
wholesalers” without any reliable means to track retail purchases.219
CONCLUSION
Before we compromise the Constitution, undermining the
principles of federalism and separation of powers, and violating
rights recognized expressly in the Second Amendment and implicitly in the Ninth, we ought to be sure of three things: First,
that we’ve identified the real problem; second, that we have pinpointed its cause; and third, that our fix is less intrusive than alternative fixes. The spreading litigation against gun makers fails
all three tests. Guns do not increase violence—they reduce violence. Banning or regulating firearms will not eliminate the underlying social pathologies that cause violence. Moreover, a less
intrusive remedy already exists—the enforcement of existing
laws.
There is a lesson to be learned from all of this. If nothing is
done to rein in baseless, government-sponsored lawsuits, private
attorneys and their accomplices in the public sector will continue
to invent legal theories to exact tribute from friendless industries.
In the latest rounds of litigation, law-abiding gun manufacturers
may be forced to pay for the actions of criminals. That outcome
will likely entice politicians unwilling to make tough choices and
will enrich trial lawyers. There can be no pretense, however, that
litigation of that sort has any basis at all in the rule of law.
The American public—especially voters and jurors—must be
warned that our tort system is rapidly becoming a tool for extortion by a coterie of politicians and trial lawyers. Sometimes they
218
219
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seek money; sometimes they pursue policy goals; often they
abuse their power. Take it from former labor secretary, Robert
Reich, certainly not renowned for his opposition to imperious
government. Reich tells us that his ex-boss in the White House,
President Clinton, launched “lawsuits to succeed where legislation failed.”220 “The strategy may work,” Reich adds, “but at the
cost of making our frail democracy even weaker. . . . This is
nothing short of faux legislation, which sacrifices democracy to
the discretion of administration officials operating in utter secrecy.”221
Reich has it just about right. But the problem outlives the
Clinton White House. It infests many of the state houses and city
halls. Like most infestations, this one can be fumigated. When
we condone the selective and retroactive application of extraordinary legal principles—intended specifically to transfer resources
from disfavored defendants to favored plaintiffs, or even worse,
to the public sector—we substitute political cronyism for fundamental fairness, profane the rule of law and debase personal
freedom.

220
221
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